To τέλος της ρωσίας στην άπω ανατολή

[Προέλλην]

Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin is tarnished as a result of Russia’s unprovoked invasion and occupation of Ukraine. Xi has been distancing China from Putin’s predations gradually — out of deference to his two biggest customers, the United States and European Union.

But on Sept. 15 his displeasure about the war became public. Putin himself admitted at a press conference following a meeting with Xi that China had “concerns” about his war in Ukraine. So did India.

But there is one more elephant in the room: Siberia, a region bigger and richer than any place on Earth, with resources that underpin Putin’s economy. It is Asian, not European, and one day will mostly fall into China’s hands. Xi knows this and needn’t lift a finger to speed along this outcome. To some, a Chinese takeover of Siberia may seem preposterous. But Putin’s flailing war against the West increases the odds that the Russian Federation itself may atomize.

Putin may eventually be removed, freeing Russia from a dictatorship but also liberating revolutionary and secessionist movements across the vast Federation. Moscow’s militarized center, with a military that’s been humiliated, will not hold. There are dozens of active secessionist movements across Russia: Chechnya, Tatarstan, Kaliningrad, Sakha Republic and others in Siberia.

In 2021, Kazimierz Wujcicki, a lecturer in Eastern European Studies at the University of Warsaw, posited six scenarios for Russia: “the fall of Russia under the influence of China”; “balkanization”; “territorial disintegration”; a “gradual but peaceful disintegration”; an “imperial” boom resulting from high oil and gas prices for years; and “modernization” in cooperation with the West.

Cooperation is not in Putin’s DNA, and his illegal invasion of Ukraine demonstrates that. Now his army is in retreat, and he may be heading toward Gotterdammerung, or the type of complete collapse that happened in 1991-92 after the Soviet Union withdrew ignominiously from Afghanistan. And Alexei Navalny and other Putin critics were stilled last year in a crackdown but remain, and their release would unleash balkanization.

Each restive region outside Siberia has chomped for decades to become independent and are in jurisdictions that were cohesive, autonomous political or cultural entities for centuries. But Siberia was nomadic until the 19th century, when Russia moved in militarily.

In ancient times, it was populated by nomadic Turkic and Mongol tribes then governed by the Mongols in the 13th century until fur traders came in the 16th century. A hundred years later, Russia extended its reach by building forts to defend migrants and as a buffer from China.

Then in 1860, the czar grabbed Chinese territory in the Far East, annexing 350,000 square miles of Manchurian China (roughly the size of Nigeria) with its verdant climate and strategic Pacific coastline, including Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan. It did so by capitalizing on a series of unjust treaties that became known as the Amur Annexation, which was foisted on the Qing Dynasty by the West to settle the hideous Opium Wars. (These treaties also handed over Hong Kong to the British.) They are still resented by China today.

Today, about 34 million out of 144 million Russians live in Siberia, but Russia’s economy is disproportionately dependent on Siberian resources. About 80 percent of its oil resources, 85 percent of its natural gas, 80 percent of its coal and similar amounts of precious metals and diamonds, and about 40 percent of the nation’s timber resources are scattered across this vast territory.

Despite this endowment, Russia’s economy remains peanut-sized compared to America’s and China’s. Its GDP (and living standards) have fallen since 2014 sanctions were imposed, and today its GDP is smaller than New York City’s or China’s industrialized province of Guangdong.

This is because Putin’s reign has looted the wealth of the Russian people through a combination of costly military misadventures and control of the country’s corporations and assets by his oligarchy.

Russia’s real “existential threat” is Vladimir Putin – not America or NATO or China – because his war now orphans Russia from Europe, where 75 percent of its exports go.

Europe is de-coupling from Russia, more or less permanently, and Central Asia builds infrastructure, with Chinese funding, that will carry its energy, minerals, metals and manufactured goods directly to China or Europe, bypassing Russia.

Russia’s DNA is flawed and based on human rights abuses of its own people and others, oligarchy greed, total dictatorship and a delusional aim to recreate the Soviet Union.

Russia’s rotten dictator and his elite will destroy its federation. China’s Xi knows this and so should the West and its Asian allies. It’s all about shoveling weapons and money to the Ukrainians to defeat Russia’s hapless military and let the Kremlin implode, fully removing the most toxic nation-state on the planet.

Diane Francis is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington at its Eurasia Center. She is editor at large at National Post in Canada, a columnist with Kyiv Post, author of 10 books and specializes in geopolitics, white-collar crime, technology and business. She writes a newsletter about America twice weekly on Substack.

https://thehill.com/opinion/internation ... n-siberia/

[Προέλλην]

Why China Will Reclaim Siberia



“A land without people for a people without land.” At the turn of the 20th century, that slogan promoted Jewish migration to Palestine. It could be recycled today, justifying a Chinese takeover of Siberia. Of course, Russia's Asian hinterland isn't really empty (and neither was Palestine). But Siberia is as resource-rich and people-poor as China is the opposite. The weight of that logic scares the Kremlin.

Moscow recently restored the Imperial Arch in the Far Eastern frontier town of Blagoveshchensk, declaring: “The earth along the Amur was, is and always will be Russian.” But Russia's title to all of the land is only about 150 years old. And the sprawl of highrises in Heihe, the Chinese boomtown on the south bank of the Amur, right across from Blagoveshchensk, casts doubt on the “always will be” part of the old czarist slogan.

Siberia – the Asian part of Russia, east of the Ural Mountains – is immense. It takes up three-quarters of Russia's land mass, the equivalent of the entire U.S. and India put together. It's hard to imagine such a vast area changing hands. But like love, a border is real only if both sides believe in it. And on both sides of the Sino-Russian border, that belief is wavering.

The border, all 2,738 miles of it, is the legacy of the Convention of Peking of 1860 and other unequal pacts between a strong, expanding Russia and a weakened China after the Second Opium War. (Other European powers similarly encroached upon China, but from the south. Hence the former British foothold in Hong Kong, for example.)

The 1.35 billion Chinese people south of the border outnumber Russia's 144 million almost 10 to 1. The discrepancy is even starker for Siberia on its own, home to barely 38 million people, and especially the border area, where only 6 million Russians face over 90 million Chinese. With intermarriage, trade and investment across that border, Siberians have realized that, for better or for worse, Beijing is a lot closer than Moscow.

The vast expanses of Siberia would provide not just room for China's huddled masses, now squeezed into the coastal half of their country by the mountains and deserts of western China. The land is already providing China, “the factory of the world,” with much of its raw materials, especially oil, gas and timber. Increasingly, Chinese-owned factories in Siberia churn out finished goods, as if the region already were a part of the Middle Kingdom's economy.

One day, China might want the globe to match the reality. In fact, Beijing could use Russia's own strategy: hand out passports to sympathizers in contested areas, then move in militarily to "protect its citizens." The Kremlin has tried that in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and most recently the Crimea, all formally part of other post-Soviet states, but controlled by Moscow. And if Beijing chose to take Siberia by force, the only way Moscow could stop would be using nuclear weapons.

There is another path: Under Vladimir Putin, Russia is increasingly looking east for its future – building a Eurasian Union even wider than the one inaugurated recently in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, a staunch Moscow ally. Perhaps two existing blocs – the Eurasian one encompassing Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – could unite China, Russia and most of the 'stans. Putin's critics fear that this economic integration would reduce Russia, especially Siberia, to a raw materials exporter beholden to Greater China. And as the Chinese learned from the humiliation of 1860, facts on the ground can become lines on the map.

https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2 ... im-siberia

Iστορικά, τουλάχιστον το Αμούρ, ανήκε στην κινεζική αυτοκρατορία, και οι ιμπεριλιαστές ρώσοι το έκλεψαν. Do the math

[Προέλλην]

Was China Betting on Russian Defeat All Along?



China has been seen by many as the most important ally of Russia in the invasion of Ukraine. However, after nearly two weeks of fighting, confusing episodes have been culminating around China’s attitude to the war. Regarding both the UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, China has abstained rather than voted on the side of Russia. Regarding the sanctions on Russia, China hasn’t shown much of a willingness to help thus far, and two major Chinese banks, the Bank of China and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, have even refused to help Russia process export transactions. Instead of supporting Russia, Chinese minister of foreign affairs, Wang Yi has called for de-escalation of the conflict. China seems to be pulling back its support from Russia, everywhere from diplomacy to economics.

On the other hand, however, Chinese statements right before the war seemed to have indicated Beijing’s full support for Moscow, and the fact that Russia waited for the end of the Beijing Winter Olympics seems to confirm rumors that Xi asked Putin to do so, indicating in turn that China was fully aware of what was coming, and decided to support it in full knowledge. Thus: Full support for the invasion before it started, but then a gradual pulling back once the invasion was underway – What’s going on here? Did China change its mind due to some unexpected occurrence?

What if nothing such happened, but it was a consistent strategy to encourage Russia to attack at first, but roll back its support after the war has started? Knowing the history of Sino-Russian relations, a Russian victory doesn’t seem to be in China’s interest. What is in China’s interest is a prolonged war of attrition, draining Russia’s resources as much as possible, weakening it as much as possible, meanwhile isolating it from the West as much as possible, and with a Russian defeat at the end.



A Brief History of Sino-Russian Relations

Throughout most of the history of Sino-Russian relations, Russia was an adversary, rather than an ally of China. Russia’s aim is not to become the junior partner in a Sino-Russian alliance, but to be a great power in its own right. Russia has a great power identity of its own, which means it pursues its great power agenda on its own, and as history has shown us, whenever that agenda crossed the interests of China, Moscow seldom hesitated to confront Beijing and, the stronger it was, the more it was willing to confront directly. Russia has grabbed roughly one million square miles from China in the treaties of Aigun and Beijing in 1858-1860 – an area called “Outer Manchuria,” the northern periphery of Manchuria up until that point – and the territory has hitherto been known as the Russian Far East, with Vladivostok and Khabarovsk established there by Russian colonists. Chinese historiography still considers these treaties as “unequal treaties,” the Western humiliation of China, and thus even if legally legitimate, they are at least morally illegitimate. Mongolia as well as the Tuvan autonomous republic of Russia were parts of China until the fall of the Qing Empire in 1911. Russia first supported them gaining de facto independence in the 1910s with Mongolia serving as a strategic buffer state against China. Then, the Bolsheviks expanded communist rule to Mongolia and Tuva as well. After the Second World War, the Soviet Union achieved formal recognition of Mongolia’s independence by the People’s Republic of China, and annexed Tuva directly. Sino-Soviet cooperation after the communist victory in China in 1949 lasted a mere decade, and after the Sino-Soviet split occurred in the late 1950s, the two great powers even fought a brief border war in 1969 alongside the very sections of the border that Russia acquired in the unequal treaties of 1858-1860. Relations between the two countries only warmed up after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with Russia becoming both weak enough to seek the friendship of, and to be viewed as harmless by, China. The formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization seemed to show a start of a Sino-Russia alliance, however a Chinese proposal for an SCO free trade area was refused by Russia, showing Moscow’s fears in the East: With its population a mere one-tenth of China, and its economy a mere fraction of the latter’s, the only factor remaining for Russia to appear in power alongside China, the same way as Canada appears alongside the US, is its military. Later, adding India and Pakistan with their mutual antagonism to the SCO diluted the organization to the point of strategic meaninglessness and turned it into something like an Asian version of the OSCE at best. Russia views Kazakhstan as its own sphere of influence, while China, by connecting the country to itself with oil pipelines and investing in the Kazakh energy industry, is interested in enhancing Kazakhstan’s independence from Russia and making it a major energy supplier for China. To cut it short, Sino-Russian cooperation in recent years was merely about having found a common ground against the US, rather than the two viewing each other as truly trustworthy allies.

How would a Russian victory or a Russian defeat come into this picture? A Russian victory would definitely not be in the interest of China. By raising the population of the Eurasian Union, Russia’s broader sphere of influence, from 185 million to 226 million through the incorporation of Ukraine, and enhancing Russia’s strategic positions against the NATO and EU by eliminating a buffer country of 41 million inhabitants, Russia would become significantly stronger than it was before the war, and such a change would be close in geopolitical terms to a kind of re-establishment of the Soviet Union. Significantly stronger, which means less willing to cooperate with China, more willing to pursue its own great power agenda, to pursue it to a degree where it may even harm Chinese interests, aiming to position itself as a third player between the US and China equal to both, rather than the ally of China.



What a Russian Defeat Looks Like

However, a Russian defeat, which still seems to be possible, especially if it comes at the end of a prolonged war of attrition, significantly weakening Russia and isolating it from the West at the same time, would put it in a position where it would hardly have any other choice but to become a junior partner in a Sino-Russian alliance, if not a mere satellite of China. Russia’s military might, that which made it so far appear as China’s equal, has not only shown through this war to be way less formidable than the world thought, but has also suffered heavy losses, and will continue to suffer heavy losses as long as the war goes on. According to a 2020 leak by the Russian website Lenta for instance, Russia has less than 3,000 operational tanks; according to Ukrainian sources, more than 300 of them have already been destroyed, which means more than 10% of all tanks Russia has, in a mere two weeks. Oryx, an independent military blog on the other hand estimates the losses of Russia to be 181 tanks as of the morning of the 10th of March 2022. This number, though lower, still shows an alarming rate of 12 tanks on average lost each day, and even on this rate, Russia will lose 10% of its tanks by March 20.

Russia was said to have amassed 60% of its conventional ground arsenal on the border of Ukraine, and this rate has only risen since then. If such a momentous effort by Russia continues with such high losses, the Russian military will be a mere shell of its former self by the end, not to mention the damage done to Russia’s economy by the sanctions. Such a weakened Russia, isolated from the West, would have little choice but to ally itself with China on whatever terms the latter demands. This would provide China with a committed and docile strategic ally, and with access to the natural resources of Siberia.

The only major danger for China in case of a Russian defeat is the possibility of a pro-Western regime change. As more time passes with no particular advance of the Russian war effort in Ukraine, more and more discussion raises on the possibility of a possible coup against Vladimir Putin in case the war ends up in an obvious and undeniable fiasco for Russia, as in this case, all the sacrifice Russia had to suffer for the war would be proven to have been in vain. However, there are several factors to be taken into consideration here: First, in case of a Russian fiasco, a regime change is a mere possibility that may or may not happen, while in case of a Russian victory, the virtual reestablishment of the Soviet Empire would be a certainty, therefore, the latter one is a certain evil for China, while in case of a former one, the bad outcome is only a mere possibility for China. Vladimir Putin could very well stay in power, and in that case, a weakened Russia would be the most isolated from the West, thus the most dependent on an alliance with China. Second, even if a regime change occurs, it is not at all sure whether it will be an elite change as well. It could easily happen in a way where the second line of Putin’s leadership simply removes Putin himself, putting the blame for their own responsibility in the war on him as well; however, they, and the United Russia party continue to govern the country. Third, if the regime change is not a mere insider job, but brings down the United Russia party and its elite itself, even then, throughout elections during the last decade, the two strongest Russian opposition parties were not pro-Western parties, but Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s far-right party and the Communists. Thus even if the United Russia party falls from power, then most likely it would be either Zhirinovsky, or the Communists, or an alliance of both that would take over the country, and not some pro-Western government. Fourth, even if somehow some pro-Western group attempts to take control, given the immense support of not only the United Russia party but of the Party of Zhirinovsky and the Communists, public support for anti-Western Russian nationalism seems to be so strong, that any pro-Western takeover attempt would likely end up in prolonged turmoil or even a civil war. This, however, as we will see, would be something that China could take advantage of.

Regarding the probability of Russia weakening as a result of the war, such a change will certainly happen if it ends with anything sort of an outright Russian victory. Moreover, Russia will likely end up not only weakened but weakened in a way that it will most likely never again achieve the position it had among the great powers of the world before the war. Russia’s demographic and economic resources are in fact so weak, that what is surprising is not the weakness its military shows in Ukraine, but more how it managed to remain so strong so long after the fall of the Soviet Union. Regarding the size of its population Russia is the mere 9th on the global ranking, behind countries like Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Regarding its economy, measured by its GDP on a nominal rate, it is merely the 11th, behind countries like Canada, Italy, and South Korea. Moreover, as its economy is dominated by the exports of crude oil, natural gas, raw materials, and wheat, it is significantly less sophisticated than these economies. Given such weak positions in demographics and economy, Russia’s great power status was merely maintained due to what military capabilities it inherited from Soviet times, and a weakened international status after the war would merely mean it taking the rank for which its economic and demographic weight has already predestined it for anyway. Moreover, the mere exposure of the relative weakness of its military that the world is witnessing now is already a weakening of Russia’s international position, as earlier, the mere fact that the world perceived its military as much more powerful than it actually was conveyed a stronger international positioned. Thus, besides the actual military capabilities that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union, the mere general belief of it having been stronger than it actually was – this is a strength that it will never regain. Therefore, in the event of defeat, a weakened Russia isolated from the West finds itself in a position with no choice but to align itself with China, situating the country as junior partner in an alliance not only for a brief period until it recovers from the war, but for the long run, for decades to come.



The Siberia Factor

The key geopolitical factor in Sino-Russian relations above all is Siberia. The attitudes of China towards Siberia have long been the subject of discussion. Siberia, a vast, sparsely populated region rich in natural resources right next to China, and its gargantuan, resource-hungry economy obviously demands attention. Safe access to its natural resources would mean a most favorable guarantee for the security of China’s economy, while Siberia under hostile rule would be strangling for it. Thus declared or not, achieving safe access to Siberia’s natural resources is a de facto core geopolitical interest for China. Theoretically speaking, China can achieve this in two ways. One way, the nice and clean one, is via some kind of alliance with Russia. The other one, the ugly way, is to grab Siberia or parts of it by force. In the case of an alliance with Russia, the weaker Russia is the better for China, as a strong, independent-minded Russia may use China’s reliance on Siberian resources against it, while a weak Russia is less likely to dare to do so. Regarding the ugly option, Siberia is strategically vulnerable to China to a great degree in many ways. East Siberia, east of the river Yenisei with its enormous area of more than 10 million square kilometers, covers about 60% of Russia’s territory, but at the same time, only about 10% of Russia’s population, 14 million people actually live there, while Manchuria and Inner-Mongolia, China’s neighboring northern regions have a combined population of no less than 123 million people. In fact, East Siberia’s population of 14 million people is less than the urban area of each of the top three cities of China – Beijing, Shanghai, or Chongqing – and roughly equal to the population of Guangzhou or Tianjin, and it is also less than the population of Taiwan. Moreover, vast regions of East Siberia are autonomous federal subjects of indigenous Asian ethnic groups of Russia, where Russian rule has met some resistance every once in a while over the past centuries. On the other hand, however, as Russia is a nuclear power, such an attempt could likely mean nuclear war, which China would surely not dare to risk.

However, in the unlikely but not outright impossible case discussed above, if an obvious and undeniable fiasco in Ukraine triggers a coup or some other form of regime change in Russia that fails to take place quickly and smoothly and ends up in prolonged internal turmoil or even civil war, such a situation could be the “now or never” moment for China to march into Siberia, probably under the pretext of peacekeeping or something similar. This is however still a scenario of a very low likelihood, as a peculiar combination of events, factors and intents should take place for it to occur, so the more realistic scenario that China could, and possibly already is aspiring for is simply the one where the war weakens, and simultaneously isolates Russia from the West to such a degree where it has no other choice but to align itself with China and accept a junior role in the alliance. Although even in this case, given the strategic vulnerability of East Siberia, the mere undeclared possibility of the ugly option could easily be used by China to put Russia under psychological pressure any time the latter considers leaving the alliance.

We don’t know whether if China has rolled back its support for Russia for the reasons stated above or not. We do know, however, that if China wanted Russia to win, it would need to adopt a different approach than the one that it is following right now, and the Beijing elite is doubtlessly aware of this. China may have concerns about Western sanctions in case it provided additional assistance, however as Beijing didn’t seem afraid to embark on a trade war with the US and Australia before, these concerns would unlikely prevent it from helping Russia if it saw a Russian victory as something vital for its global aspirations. Thus, the simplest explanation is that China doesn’t want Russia to win because a victorious Russia would likely become too assertive to handle, while a defeated, weakened, isolated Russia would have no choice but become a docile strategic ally of China, granting access to the natural resources of Siberia in the process. Given the fact that China seems to have been aware of the Russian plans to invade Ukraine from the very beginning, and encouraged Russia to do so, only to roll back its support once the war started, this all suggests that China may have been betting on a Russian defeat all along.

https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/was ... all-along/

[Perseus1966]

Το εμβολιο θα φταει

[pluton]

Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin is tarnished as a result of Russia’s unprovoked invasion and occupation of Ukraine. Xi has been distancing China from Putin’s predations gradually — out of deference to his two biggest customers, the United States and European Union.

But on Sept. 15 his displeasure about the war became public. Putin himself admitted at a press conference following a meeting with Xi that China had “concerns” about his war in Ukraine. So did India.

But there is one more elephant in the room: Siberia, a region bigger and richer than any place on Earth, with resources that underpin Putin’s economy. It is Asian, not European, and one day will mostly fall into China’s hands. Xi knows this and needn’t lift a finger to speed along this outcome. To some, a Chinese takeover of Siberia may seem preposterous. But Putin’s flailing war against the West increases the odds that the Russian Federation itself may atomize.

Putin may eventually be removed, freeing Russia from a dictatorship but also liberating revolutionary and secessionist movements across the vast Federation. Moscow’s militarized center, with a military that’s been humiliated, will not hold. There are dozens of active secessionist movements across Russia: Chechnya, Tatarstan, Kaliningrad, Sakha Republic and others in Siberia.

In 2021, Kazimierz Wujcicki, a lecturer in Eastern European Studies at the University of Warsaw, posited six scenarios for Russia: “the fall of Russia under the influence of China”; “balkanization”; “territorial disintegration”; a “gradual but peaceful disintegration”; an “imperial” boom resulting from high oil and gas prices for years; and “modernization” in cooperation with the West.

Cooperation is not in Putin’s DNA, and his illegal invasion of Ukraine demonstrates that. Now his army is in retreat, and he may be heading toward Gotterdammerung, or the type of complete collapse that happened in 1991-92 after the Soviet Union withdrew ignominiously from Afghanistan. And Alexei Navalny and other Putin critics were stilled last year in a crackdown but remain, and their release would unleash balkanization.

Each restive region outside Siberia has chomped for decades to become independent and are in jurisdictions that were cohesive, autonomous political or cultural entities for centuries. But Siberia was nomadic until the 19th century, when Russia moved in militarily.

In ancient times, it was populated by nomadic Turkic and Mongol tribes then governed by the Mongols in the 13th century until fur traders came in the 16th century. A hundred years later, Russia extended its reach by building forts to defend migrants and as a buffer from China.

Then in 1860, the czar grabbed Chinese territory in the Far East, annexing 350,000 square miles of Manchurian China (roughly the size of Nigeria) with its verdant climate and strategic Pacific coastline, including Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan. It did so by capitalizing on a series of unjust treaties that became known as the Amur Annexation, which was foisted on the Qing Dynasty by the West to settle the hideous Opium Wars. (These treaties also handed over Hong Kong to the British.) They are still resented by China today.

Today, about 34 million out of 144 million Russians live in Siberia, but Russia’s economy is disproportionately dependent on Siberian resources. About 80 percent of its oil resources, 85 percent of its natural gas, 80 percent of its coal and similar amounts of precious metals and diamonds, and about 40 percent of the nation’s timber resources are scattered across this vast territory.

Despite this endowment, Russia’s economy remains peanut-sized compared to America’s and China’s. Its GDP (and living standards) have fallen since 2014 sanctions were imposed, and today its GDP is smaller than New York City’s or China’s industrialized province of Guangdong.

This is because Putin’s reign has looted the wealth of the Russian people through a combination of costly military misadventures and control of the country’s corporations and assets by his oligarchy.

Russia’s real “existential threat” is Vladimir Putin – not America or NATO or China – because his war now orphans Russia from Europe, where 75 percent of its exports go.

Europe is de-coupling from Russia, more or less permanently, and Central Asia builds infrastructure, with Chinese funding, that will carry its energy, minerals, metals and manufactured goods directly to China or Europe, bypassing Russia.

Russia’s DNA is flawed and based on human rights abuses of its own people and others, oligarchy greed, total dictatorship and a delusional aim to recreate the Soviet Union.

Russia’s rotten dictator and his elite will destroy its federation. China’s Xi knows this and so should the West and its Asian allies. It’s all about shoveling weapons and money to the Ukrainians to defeat Russia’s hapless military and let the Kremlin implode, fully removing the most toxic nation-state on the planet.

Diane Francis is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington at its Eurasia Center. She is editor at large at National Post in Canada, a columnist with Kyiv Post, author of 10 books and specializes in geopolitics, white-collar crime, technology and business. She writes a newsletter about America twice weekly on Substack.

https://thehill.com/opinion/internation ... n-siberia/

Στην συνέχεια θα διαβάσω και άλλα.... Πρέπει να ξέρεις ότι το θέμα της συνεκμετάλλευσης της Σιβηρίας το έθεσε στα πλαίσια της κομμουνιστικής αλληλεγγύης στις αρχές της δεκαετίας του πενήντα ο Μάο Τσε Τουνγκ στον Στάλιν.

Του πρότεινε δηλαδή για να αντιμετωπίσουν τον καπιταλισμό, να στείλει η κομμουνιστική Κίνα μερικά εκατομμύρια εργάτες στην Σιβηρία για μόνιμη εγκατάσταση, ώστε σε πρώτη φάση να εκμεταλλευτούν τον δασικό πλούτο της περιοχής.

Στόχος του κομμουνιστή Κινέζου ηγέτη ήταν καθαρά εθνικός, δηλαδή να αλλάξει την πληθυσμιακή σύνθεση της Σιβηρίας.

Ο Στάλιν αρνήθηκε και φυσικά ενήργησε έτσι όχι σαν κομμουνιστής αλλά σαν εθνικιστής.... Έκτοτε οι σχέσεις των δύο χωρών πέρασαν σε μια εχθρική κατάσταση.... Σήμερα μέσα στα ρωσικά αδιέξοδα λόγω Ουκρανίας η Κίνα επανέρχεται όχι πια σαν κομμουνιστικός εταίρος αλλά σαν οικονομικός εταίρος, στόχος βέβαια είναι η Σιβηρία. Το ξέρουν και οι Ρώσοι αυτό, έτσι αυτή η προσέγγιση εκ των πραγμάτων στην καλύτερη περίπτωση θα οδηγήσει κάποια στιγμή σε πόλεμο μεταξύ της Κίνας και της Ρωσίας.


Διάβαζε να μαθαίνεις Λαχουρενιε.



Μόνο το ΚΚΕ ήθελε να παραδώσει ελληνικά εδάφη στους Σλάβους, οι Σλάβοι κομμουνιστές σκεφτοντουσαν εθνικά.

[pluton]

Why China Will Reclaim Siberia



“A land without people for a people without land.” At the turn of the 20th century, that slogan promoted Jewish migration to Palestine. It could be recycled today, justifying a Chinese takeover of Siberia. Of course, Russia's Asian hinterland isn't really empty (and neither was Palestine). But Siberia is as resource-rich and people-poor as China is the opposite. The weight of that logic scares the Kremlin.

Moscow recently restored the Imperial Arch in the Far Eastern frontier town of Blagoveshchensk, declaring: “The earth along the Amur was, is and always will be Russian.” But Russia's title to all of the land is only about 150 years old. And the sprawl of highrises in Heihe, the Chinese boomtown on the south bank of the Amur, right across from Blagoveshchensk, casts doubt on the “always will be” part of the old czarist slogan.

Siberia – the Asian part of Russia, east of the Ural Mountains – is immense. It takes up three-quarters of Russia's land mass, the equivalent of the entire U.S. and India put together. It's hard to imagine such a vast area changing hands. But like love, a border is real only if both sides believe in it. And on both sides of the Sino-Russian border, that belief is wavering.

The border, all 2,738 miles of it, is the legacy of the Convention of Peking of 1860 and other unequal pacts between a strong, expanding Russia and a weakened China after the Second Opium War. (Other European powers similarly encroached upon China, but from the south. Hence the former British foothold in Hong Kong, for example.)

The 1.35 billion Chinese people south of the border outnumber Russia's 144 million almost 10 to 1. The discrepancy is even starker for Siberia on its own, home to barely 38 million people, and especially the border area, where only 6 million Russians face over 90 million Chinese. With intermarriage, trade and investment across that border, Siberians have realized that, for better or for worse, Beijing is a lot closer than Moscow.

The vast expanses of Siberia would provide not just room for China's huddled masses, now squeezed into the coastal half of their country by the mountains and deserts of western China. The land is already providing China, “the factory of the world,” with much of its raw materials, especially oil, gas and timber. Increasingly, Chinese-owned factories in Siberia churn out finished goods, as if the region already were a part of the Middle Kingdom's economy.

One day, China might want the globe to match the reality. In fact, Beijing could use Russia's own strategy: hand out passports to sympathizers in contested areas, then move in militarily to "protect its citizens." The Kremlin has tried that in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and most recently the Crimea, all formally part of other post-Soviet states, but controlled by Moscow. And if Beijing chose to take Siberia by force, the only way Moscow could stop would be using nuclear weapons.

There is another path: Under Vladimir Putin, Russia is increasingly looking east for its future – building a Eurasian Union even wider than the one inaugurated recently in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, a staunch Moscow ally. Perhaps two existing blocs – the Eurasian one encompassing Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – could unite China, Russia and most of the 'stans. Putin's critics fear that this economic integration would reduce Russia, especially Siberia, to a raw materials exporter beholden to Greater China. And as the Chinese learned from the humiliation of 1860, facts on the ground can become lines on the map.

https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2 ... im-siberia

Iστορικά, τουλάχιστον το Αμούρ, ανήκε στην κινεζική αυτοκρατορία, και οι ιμπεριλιαστές ρώσοι το έκλεψαν. Do the math

Σωστά, αλλά σιγά μη επιτρέψει η Δύση να μετατραπεί εδαφικά η Κίνα σε Ρωσία του Πούτιν.

Προφανώς η Σιβηρία θα χωριστεί σε δέκα ανεξάρτητα κράτη ελεγχόμενα από την Δύση και η Κίνα, ασφαλώς και θα καταστραφεί και θα διαμελιστεί.

Συμφωνείς Ραν ταν πλαν;

[pluton]

Was China Betting on Russian Defeat All Along?



China has been seen by many as the most important ally of Russia in the invasion of Ukraine. However, after nearly two weeks of fighting, confusing episodes have been culminating around China’s attitude to the war. Regarding both the UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, China has abstained rather than voted on the side of Russia. Regarding the sanctions on Russia, China hasn’t shown much of a willingness to help thus far, and two major Chinese banks, the Bank of China and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, have even refused to help Russia process export transactions. Instead of supporting Russia, Chinese minister of foreign affairs, Wang Yi has called for de-escalation of the conflict. China seems to be pulling back its support from Russia, everywhere from diplomacy to economics.

On the other hand, however, Chinese statements right before the war seemed to have indicated Beijing’s full support for Moscow, and the fact that Russia waited for the end of the Beijing Winter Olympics seems to confirm rumors that Xi asked Putin to do so, indicating in turn that China was fully aware of what was coming, and decided to support it in full knowledge. Thus: Full support for the invasion before it started, but then a gradual pulling back once the invasion was underway – What’s going on here? Did China change its mind due to some unexpected occurrence?

What if nothing such happened, but it was a consistent strategy to encourage Russia to attack at first, but roll back its support after the war has started? Knowing the history of Sino-Russian relations, a Russian victory doesn’t seem to be in China’s interest. What is in China’s interest is a prolonged war of attrition, draining Russia’s resources as much as possible, weakening it as much as possible, meanwhile isolating it from the West as much as possible, and with a Russian defeat at the end.



A Brief History of Sino-Russian Relations

Throughout most of the history of Sino-Russian relations, Russia was an adversary, rather than an ally of China. Russia’s aim is not to become the junior partner in a Sino-Russian alliance, but to be a great power in its own right. Russia has a great power identity of its own, which means it pursues its great power agenda on its own, and as history has shown us, whenever that agenda crossed the interests of China, Moscow seldom hesitated to confront Beijing and, the stronger it was, the more it was willing to confront directly. Russia has grabbed roughly one million square miles from China in the treaties of Aigun and Beijing in 1858-1860 – an area called “Outer Manchuria,” the northern periphery of Manchuria up until that point – and the territory has hitherto been known as the Russian Far East, with Vladivostok and Khabarovsk established there by Russian colonists. Chinese historiography still considers these treaties as “unequal treaties,” the Western humiliation of China, and thus even if legally legitimate, they are at least morally illegitimate. Mongolia as well as the Tuvan autonomous republic of Russia were parts of China until the fall of the Qing Empire in 1911. Russia first supported them gaining de facto independence in the 1910s with Mongolia serving as a strategic buffer state against China. Then, the Bolsheviks expanded communist rule to Mongolia and Tuva as well. After the Second World War, the Soviet Union achieved formal recognition of Mongolia’s independence by the People’s Republic of China, and annexed Tuva directly. Sino-Soviet cooperation after the communist victory in China in 1949 lasted a mere decade, and after the Sino-Soviet split occurred in the late 1950s, the two great powers even fought a brief border war in 1969 alongside the very sections of the border that Russia acquired in the unequal treaties of 1858-1860. Relations between the two countries only warmed up after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with Russia becoming both weak enough to seek the friendship of, and to be viewed as harmless by, China. The formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization seemed to show a start of a Sino-Russia alliance, however a Chinese proposal for an SCO free trade area was refused by Russia, showing Moscow’s fears in the East: With its population a mere one-tenth of China, and its economy a mere fraction of the latter’s, the only factor remaining for Russia to appear in power alongside China, the same way as Canada appears alongside the US, is its military. Later, adding India and Pakistan with their mutual antagonism to the SCO diluted the organization to the point of strategic meaninglessness and turned it into something like an Asian version of the OSCE at best. Russia views Kazakhstan as its own sphere of influence, while China, by connecting the country to itself with oil pipelines and investing in the Kazakh energy industry, is interested in enhancing Kazakhstan’s independence from Russia and making it a major energy supplier for China. To cut it short, Sino-Russian cooperation in recent years was merely about having found a common ground against the US, rather than the two viewing each other as truly trustworthy allies.

How would a Russian victory or a Russian defeat come into this picture? A Russian victory would definitely not be in the interest of China. By raising the population of the Eurasian Union, Russia’s broader sphere of influence, from 185 million to 226 million through the incorporation of Ukraine, and enhancing Russia’s strategic positions against the NATO and EU by eliminating a buffer country of 41 million inhabitants, Russia would become significantly stronger than it was before the war, and such a change would be close in geopolitical terms to a kind of re-establishment of the Soviet Union. Significantly stronger, which means less willing to cooperate with China, more willing to pursue its own great power agenda, to pursue it to a degree where it may even harm Chinese interests, aiming to position itself as a third player between the US and China equal to both, rather than the ally of China.



What a Russian Defeat Looks Like

However, a Russian defeat, which still seems to be possible, especially if it comes at the end of a prolonged war of attrition, significantly weakening Russia and isolating it from the West at the same time, would put it in a position where it would hardly have any other choice but to become a junior partner in a Sino-Russian alliance, if not a mere satellite of China. Russia’s military might, that which made it so far appear as China’s equal, has not only shown through this war to be way less formidable than the world thought, but has also suffered heavy losses, and will continue to suffer heavy losses as long as the war goes on. According to a 2020 leak by the Russian website Lenta for instance, Russia has less than 3,000 operational tanks; according to Ukrainian sources, more than 300 of them have already been destroyed, which means more than 10% of all tanks Russia has, in a mere two weeks. Oryx, an independent military blog on the other hand estimates the losses of Russia to be 181 tanks as of the morning of the 10th of March 2022. This number, though lower, still shows an alarming rate of 12 tanks on average lost each day, and even on this rate, Russia will lose 10% of its tanks by March 20.

Russia was said to have amassed 60% of its conventional ground arsenal on the border of Ukraine, and this rate has only risen since then. If such a momentous effort by Russia continues with such high losses, the Russian military will be a mere shell of its former self by the end, not to mention the damage done to Russia’s economy by the sanctions. Such a weakened Russia, isolated from the West, would have little choice but to ally itself with China on whatever terms the latter demands. This would provide China with a committed and docile strategic ally, and with access to the natural resources of Siberia.

The only major danger for China in case of a Russian defeat is the possibility of a pro-Western regime change. As more time passes with no particular advance of the Russian war effort in Ukraine, more and more discussion raises on the possibility of a possible coup against Vladimir Putin in case the war ends up in an obvious and undeniable fiasco for Russia, as in this case, all the sacrifice Russia had to suffer for the war would be proven to have been in vain. However, there are several factors to be taken into consideration here: First, in case of a Russian fiasco, a regime change is a mere possibility that may or may not happen, while in case of a Russian victory, the virtual reestablishment of the Soviet Empire would be a certainty, therefore, the latter one is a certain evil for China, while in case of a former one, the bad outcome is only a mere possibility for China. Vladimir Putin could very well stay in power, and in that case, a weakened Russia would be the most isolated from the West, thus the most dependent on an alliance with China. Second, even if a regime change occurs, it is not at all sure whether it will be an elite change as well. It could easily happen in a way where the second line of Putin’s leadership simply removes Putin himself, putting the blame for their own responsibility in the war on him as well; however, they, and the United Russia party continue to govern the country. Third, if the regime change is not a mere insider job, but brings down the United Russia party and its elite itself, even then, throughout elections during the last decade, the two strongest Russian opposition parties were not pro-Western parties, but Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s far-right party and the Communists. Thus even if the United Russia party falls from power, then most likely it would be either Zhirinovsky, or the Communists, or an alliance of both that would take over the country, and not some pro-Western government. Fourth, even if somehow some pro-Western group attempts to take control, given the immense support of not only the United Russia party but of the Party of Zhirinovsky and the Communists, public support for anti-Western Russian nationalism seems to be so strong, that any pro-Western takeover attempt would likely end up in prolonged turmoil or even a civil war. This, however, as we will see, would be something that China could take advantage of.

Regarding the probability of Russia weakening as a result of the war, such a change will certainly happen if it ends with anything sort of an outright Russian victory. Moreover, Russia will likely end up not only weakened but weakened in a way that it will most likely never again achieve the position it had among the great powers of the world before the war. Russia’s demographic and economic resources are in fact so weak, that what is surprising is not the weakness its military shows in Ukraine, but more how it managed to remain so strong so long after the fall of the Soviet Union. Regarding the size of its population Russia is the mere 9th on the global ranking, behind countries like Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Regarding its economy, measured by its GDP on a nominal rate, it is merely the 11th, behind countries like Canada, Italy, and South Korea. Moreover, as its economy is dominated by the exports of crude oil, natural gas, raw materials, and wheat, it is significantly less sophisticated than these economies. Given such weak positions in demographics and economy, Russia’s great power status was merely maintained due to what military capabilities it inherited from Soviet times, and a weakened international status after the war would merely mean it taking the rank for which its economic and demographic weight has already predestined it for anyway. Moreover, the mere exposure of the relative weakness of its military that the world is witnessing now is already a weakening of Russia’s international position, as earlier, the mere fact that the world perceived its military as much more powerful than it actually was conveyed a stronger international positioned. Thus, besides the actual military capabilities that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union, the mere general belief of it having been stronger than it actually was – this is a strength that it will never regain. Therefore, in the event of defeat, a weakened Russia isolated from the West finds itself in a position with no choice but to align itself with China, situating the country as junior partner in an alliance not only for a brief period until it recovers from the war, but for the long run, for decades to come.



The Siberia Factor

The key geopolitical factor in Sino-Russian relations above all is Siberia. The attitudes of China towards Siberia have long been the subject of discussion. Siberia, a vast, sparsely populated region rich in natural resources right next to China, and its gargantuan, resource-hungry economy obviously demands attention. Safe access to its natural resources would mean a most favorable guarantee for the security of China’s economy, while Siberia under hostile rule would be strangling for it. Thus declared or not, achieving safe access to Siberia’s natural resources is a de facto core geopolitical interest for China. Theoretically speaking, China can achieve this in two ways. One way, the nice and clean one, is via some kind of alliance with Russia. The other one, the ugly way, is to grab Siberia or parts of it by force. In the case of an alliance with Russia, the weaker Russia is the better for China, as a strong, independent-minded Russia may use China’s reliance on Siberian resources against it, while a weak Russia is less likely to dare to do so. Regarding the ugly option, Siberia is strategically vulnerable to China to a great degree in many ways. East Siberia, east of the river Yenisei with its enormous area of more than 10 million square kilometers, covers about 60% of Russia’s territory, but at the same time, only about 10% of Russia’s population, 14 million people actually live there, while Manchuria and Inner-Mongolia, China’s neighboring northern regions have a combined population of no less than 123 million people. In fact, East Siberia’s population of 14 million people is less than the urban area of each of the top three cities of China – Beijing, Shanghai, or Chongqing – and roughly equal to the population of Guangzhou or Tianjin, and it is also less than the population of Taiwan. Moreover, vast regions of East Siberia are autonomous federal subjects of indigenous Asian ethnic groups of Russia, where Russian rule has met some resistance every once in a while over the past centuries. On the other hand, however, as Russia is a nuclear power, such an attempt could likely mean nuclear war, which China would surely not dare to risk.

However, in the unlikely but not outright impossible case discussed above, if an obvious and undeniable fiasco in Ukraine triggers a coup or some other form of regime change in Russia that fails to take place quickly and smoothly and ends up in prolonged internal turmoil or even civil war, such a situation could be the “now or never” moment for China to march into Siberia, probably under the pretext of peacekeeping or something similar. This is however still a scenario of a very low likelihood, as a peculiar combination of events, factors and intents should take place for it to occur, so the more realistic scenario that China could, and possibly already is aspiring for is simply the one where the war weakens, and simultaneously isolates Russia from the West to such a degree where it has no other choice but to align itself with China and accept a junior role in the alliance. Although even in this case, given the strategic vulnerability of East Siberia, the mere undeclared possibility of the ugly option could easily be used by China to put Russia under psychological pressure any time the latter considers leaving the alliance.

We don’t know whether if China has rolled back its support for Russia for the reasons stated above or not. We do know, however, that if China wanted Russia to win, it would need to adopt a different approach than the one that it is following right now, and the Beijing elite is doubtlessly aware of this. China may have concerns about Western sanctions in case it provided additional assistance, however as Beijing didn’t seem afraid to embark on a trade war with the US and Australia before, these concerns would unlikely prevent it from helping Russia if it saw a Russian victory as something vital for its global aspirations. Thus, the simplest explanation is that China doesn’t want Russia to win because a victorious Russia would likely become too assertive to handle, while a defeated, weakened, isolated Russia would have no choice but become a docile strategic ally of China, granting access to the natural resources of Siberia in the process. Given the fact that China seems to have been aware of the Russian plans to invade Ukraine from the very beginning, and encouraged Russia to do so, only to roll back its support once the war started, this all suggests that China may have been betting on a Russian defeat all along.

https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/was ... all-along/

Αυτά που διάβασα στα τρία ποστ σου είναι οι θέσεις που υποστηρίζω και εγώ από την αρχή της εισβολής στην Ουκρανία, η Κίνα δεν είναι σύμμαχος της Ρωσίας, έχει βλέψεις σε εδάφη της Σιβηρίας.

Η διαφορά μου είναι ότι η Σιβηρία δεν θα παιχτεί μεταξύ Ρωσίας και Κίνας, αλλά και μεταξύ Δύσης, είναι πολύ πλούσιο μέρος για να επιτρέψει η Δύση να το κατέχει η Ρωσία η η Κίνα, θα διασπαστεί σε 10-15 κράτη, ελεγχόμενα.

Και η Κίνα θα διασπαστεί και η Ινδία, οι δεκαετίες που έρχονται θα διεξαχθούν σφοδροί πόλεμοι στις περιοχές αυτές. Απλά η ήττα της Ρωσίας στην Ουκρανία σφραγίζει τον δρόμο της Ρωσίας προς την Ευρώπη.

Τα κράτη της ΕΕ θα εξοπλιστούν τα επόμενα χρόνια σε τέτοιο βαθμό που η οποιαδήποτε σκέψη προς δυσμάς θα είναι αδύνατη.

Ήδη η Ιταλία δημιουργεί τον μεγαλύτερο στόλο της Μεσογείου, η Πολωνία φτιάχνει τον ισχυρότερο στρατό στην Ευρώπη, η Γερμανία σε πρώτη φάση ρίχνει για επανεξοπλισμο 100.000.000.000€ η Αγγλία ανανεώνει τον στόλο της, η Γαλλία δεν σταμάτησε ποτέ την ενίσχυση του οπλοστασίου της.

Ακόμα και περιφερειακά κράτη πχ η Ελλάδα διαθέτει μεγάλα ποσά για την ισχυροποίηση των ενόπλων δυνάμεων της, η Κύπρος εκπονεί πρόγραμμα σύγχρονου εξοπλισμού, η Αίγυπτος στην κυριολεξία διαθέτει τερατώδη ποσά για τον στρατό της.

Βλέπουμε όλη αυτή η εξοπλιστική τρέλα στέλνει μηνύματα τι περιμένουμε τα επόμενα χρόνια.

Την ίδια στιγμή η Ρωσία αιμορραγεί οικονομικά, στρατιωτικά, διπλωματικά, πολιτικά. Την ίδια πορεία ακολουθεί και η Τουρκία. Το ίδιο θα συμβεί και στην Κίνα και στην Ινδία. Ζούμε χρόνια που θα δούμε ιστορική αναδιάταξη σε όλο τον πλανήτη.

Βλέπε να μαθαίνεις Λαχουρενιε.

[pluton]

Πολλαπλά μηνύματα έστειλε η αιφνιδιαστική επίσκεψη του Ιάπωνα πρωθυπουργού Φούμιο Κισίντα στην Ουκρανία, την ώρα που ο Κινέζος πρόεδρος Σι Τζινπίνγκ ήταν στη Μόσχα, όπου είχε πολύωρες συνομιλίες με τον πρόεδρος της Ρωσίας, Βλαντίμιρ Πούτιν.

Ενώ η Κίνα επιδιώκει να παίξει τον ρόλο του ειρηνοποιού στον πόλεμο Ρωσίας και Ουκρανίας (έχει καταθέσει μάλιστα και πρόταση που οι δύο πλευρές άκουσαν με ενδιαφέρον), η Ιαπωνία είναι μια από τις λίγες χώρες εκτός Ευρώπης και Βόρειας Αμερικής που πήρε θέση στην πολεμική αναμέτρηση.


Το Τόκιο τάχθηκε ανοιχτά στο πλευρό της Ουκρανίας, αναλογιζόμενο ότι έχει κοντά του τη Ρωσία, με την οποία έχει εδώ και δεκαετίες αντιπαράθεση για συστάδα νησιών, την Κίνα, την Ταϊβάν, αλλά και τη Βόρεια Κορέα.

Η βοήθεια της Ιαπωνίας προς την Ουκρανία θα κατευθυνθεί στην ανοικοδόμηση μετά τον πόλεμο και την ανθρωπιστική βοήθεια. Παράλληλα, απορρίπτει κατηγορηματικά την προσπάθεια της Ρωσίας να αλλάξει το στάτους κβο δια της βίας.


Σε δεύτερη ανάγνωση, όπως σημειώνει το BBC, η επίσκεψη Κισίντα είναι εντυπωσιακή, όχι μόνο γιατί ήταν απροειδοποίητη για τους προφανείς λόγους ασφαλείας.


Είναι η πρώτη φορά που Ιάπωνας ηγέτης επισκέπτεται εμπόλεμη ζώνη μετά τον Β΄ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο. Πιεζόταν όμως και από το εσωτερικό του κόμματός του, γιατί ήταν ο μόνος από τους ηγέτες της G7 που δεν είχε επισκεφτεί την Ουκρανία, πόσο μάλλον που θα φιλοξενήσει τη σύνοδο των ηγετών τον Μάιο στη Χιροσίμα.

Η Ιαπωνία, σε κάθε περίπτωση, θέλει να επεκτείνει την παρουσία της στη διεθνή σκηνή, έπειτα από δεκαετίες διακριτικής παρουσίας, ενισχύοντας τις ένοπλες δυνάμεις της, κίνηση που η Κίνα παρακολουθεί με κάποια ανησυχία.

Παράλληλα ο Κισίντα θέλει να εξομαλύνει τις σχέσεις της χώρας του με τη Νότια Κορέα, δείχνοντας ένα κοινό μέτωπο έναντι των απειλών από τη Βόρεια Κορέα. Για τη Σεούλ και το Τόκιο οι ΗΠΑ είναι εξάλλου ο ισχυρός στρατηγικός σύμμαχος.

Την ίδια ώρα στη Μόσχα, ο Σι Τζινπίνγκ, ο «καλός φίλος» του Βλαντίμιρ Πούτιν, δήλωνε ουδέτερος, αλλά όλα δείχνουν ότι έχει εμφανή κλίση προς τη Μόσχα. Ήταν μια εντυπωσιακή ένδειξη ότι Τόκιο και Πεκίνο έχουν επιλέξει στρατόπεδα και το κάνουν όλο και πιο σαφές.


https://www.protothema.gr/world/article ... -oukrania/

[pluton]

Δείτε πόσο γρήγορα τρέχουν τα γεγονότα, μιλάγαμε για Σιβηρία, Ιαπωνία και Κίνα.

Η Ρωσία ενισχύει την άμυνά της κοντά στην Ιαπωνία

16:15, 22.03.2023


Η κίνηση αυτή είναι μέρος μιας ευρύτερης ενίσχυσης των αμυντικών συστημάτων της Ρωσίας στις αχανείς περιοχές της στην άπω ανατολή, δήλωσε ο υπουργός Άμυνας Σεργκέι Σοϊγκού

Η Ρωσία ανακοίνωσε σήμερα ότι μια μεραρχία των αμυντικών πυραυλικών συστημάτων της παράκτιας άμυνας Bastion αναπτύχθηκε στο Παραμουσίρ, μια από τις Κουρίλες νήσους στον βόρειο Ειρηνικό, ορισμένες από τις οποίες η Ιαπωνία θεωρεί δικό της έδαφος.

Η κίνηση αυτή είναι μέρος μιας ευρύτερης ενίσχυσης των αμυντικών συστημάτων της Ρωσίας στις αχανείς περιοχές της στην άπω ανατολή, δήλωσε ο υπουργός Άμυνας Σεργκέι Σοϊγκού, απαντώντας εν μέρει σ’ αυτό που ο ίδιος χαρακτήρισε προσπάθειες των ΗΠΑ να «περιορίσουν» τη Ρωσία και την Κίνα.



Ο Σοϊγκού μιλούσε σε ανώτατους αξιωματικούς του στρατού μια ημέρα αφότου ο πρόεδρος Βλαντίμιρ Πούτιν και ο Κινέζος ηγέτης Σι Τζινπίνγκ θεμελίωσαν την "άνευ ορίων" συνεργασία τους κατά τις συνομιλίες που είχαν στο Κρεμλίνο με συμφωνίες που υπέγραψαν για βαθύτερη ενεργειακή και στρατιωτική συνεργασία.

"Για να περιορίσουν τη Ρωσία και την Κίνα, οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες αυξάνουν σημαντικά τη στρατιωτική τους παρουσία στην περιοχή της Ασίας -Ειρηνικού, ενισχύοντας τους πολιτικούς και στρατιωτικούς δεσμούς με τους συμμάχους τους, συνεχίζοντας να δημιουργούν μια νέα αμερικανική αρχιτεκτονική ασφαλείας στην περιοχή αυτή", δήλωσε ο Σοϊγκού σε βίντεο με το μήνυμά του το οποίο έδωσε στη δημοσιότητα το υπουργείο Άμυνας της Ρωσίας.

Ο Σοϊγκού είπε ότι το σύστημα Bastion θα ενισχύσει τη ρωσική ασφάλεια γύρω από το αρχιπέλαγος των Κουρίλων νήσων.

Η Ιαπωνία, στενός σύμμαχος των ΗΠΑ, διεκδικεί τέσσερα νησιά του αρχιπελάγους των νήσων Κουρίλων, στο νότιο τμήμα του, τα οποία είχαν καταληφθεί από τις σοβιετικές δυνάμεις στο τέλος του Β' Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου. Η Ιαπωνία δεν διεκδικεί το Παραμουσίρ, ένα από τα νησιά των Κουρίλων στο βόρειο τμήμα του αρχιπελάγους των νήσων.

Το θέμα αυτό στάθηκε εμπόδιο στο να υπογράψουν η Μόσχα και το Τόκιο συνθήκη ειρήνης που θα τερμάτιζε επίσημα τις εχθροπραξίες.


Εκσυγχρονισμός

Οι ρωσικές ένοπλες δυνάμεις στα ανατολικά της χώρας έχουν παραλάβει περίπου 400 είδη σύγχρονου στρατιωτικού εξοπλισμού κατά τη διάρκεια του περασμένου έτους, συμπεριλαμβανομένων αεροσκαφών SU-57 και αντιαεροπορικών πυραυλικών συστημάτων, δήλωσε ο Σοϊγκού.

"Οι στρατιωτικές δυνατότητες της ανατολικής στρατιωτικής περιφέρειας έχουν αυξηθεί σημαντικά", είπε.

Ο Σοϊγκού δήλωσε επίσης ότι ο εκσυγχρονισμός του συστήματος αντιαεροπορικής άμυνας της Μόσχας θα ολοκληρωθεί φέτος καθώς αυξάνονται οι επιθέσεις ουκρανικών μη επανδρωμένων αεροσκαφών στο ρωσικό έδαφος.

"Φέτος, θα ολοκληρώσουμε τον εκσυγχρονισμό του πυραυλικού αμυντικού συστήματος της Μόσχας", ανέφερε ο Σοϊγκού, προσθέτοντας ότι δύο νέες μονάδες αντιαεροπορικής άμυνας θα εκπαιδευτούν και θα εξοπλιστούν με νέας γενιάς πυραυλικά συστήματα αέρος-εδάφους S-350. "Παράλληλα, θα ολοκληρώσουμε την κατασκευή 621 στρατιωτικών υποδομών για τις ανάγκες της πολεμικής αεροπορίας", πρόσθεσε ο Ρώσος υπουργός.

Ρώσοι αξιωματούχοι έχουν κατηγορήσει το Κίεβο για σειρά επιθέσεων με μη επανδρωμένα αεροσκάφη βαθιά μέσα στο ρωσικό έδαφος από την έναρξη της στρατιωτικής εκστρατείας στην Ουκρανία. Η ρωσική πρωτεύουσα δεν έχει ποτέ πληγεί άμεσα από επιθέσεις από την έναρξη της σύγκρουσης στην Ουκρανία. Τον Ιανουάριο, εικόνες που αναρτήθηκαν σε μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης έδειξαν την εγκατάσταση στη Μόσχα συστημάτων Pantsir S-1, σχεδιασμένων για την αναχαίτιση πυραύλων Κρουζ και βαλλιστικών πυραύλων.

Σχετικά με τη σύγκρουση στην Ουκρανία, ο Σοϊγκού δήλωσε ότι οι ρωσικές αεροδιαστημικές δυνάμεις έχουν μέχρι στιγμής καταστρέψει περισσότερες από 20.000 ουκρανικές στρατιωτικές εγκαταστάσεις από την έναρξη της "ειδικής στρατιωτικής επιχείρησης", όπως την αποκαλεί η Μόσχα.



https://www.capital.gr/diethni/3705667/ ... in-iaponia

[pluton]

Ένα άρθρο του 2012 που λέει πολλά.


Γίνεται η Σιβηρία Κινέζικη;

Που εκδόθηκε στις:28/09/2012 - 10:44
Τροποποιήθηκε:01/10/2012 - 15:20


Με:
Ksenia BOLCHAKOVA
|
Xavier LUIZET

Από την πτώση της Σοβιετικής Ένωσης, όλο και περισσότεροι Κινέζοι πολίτες εγκαταστάθηκαν στη Σιβηρία, αναζητώντας νέες ευκαιρίες. Οι δημοσιογράφοι του France 24 πήγαν στο Blagoveshchensk, όπου μια από τις παλαιότερες κινεζικές κοινότητες στη Ρωσία είναι καλά εδραιωμένη, αλλά όπου ορισμένοι Ρώσοι είναι πολύ ανήσυχοι με την κινεζική παρουσια.


Η πόλη Blagoveshchensk της Σιβηρίας βρίσκεται πάνω από 8.000 χιλιόμετρα από τη Μόσχα, αλλά μόλις 800 μέτρα από την Κίνα. Οι δύο χώρες χωρίζονται μόνο από τον ποταμό Αμούρ. Το χειμώνα, όταν παγώνει, το Amur μπορεί να διασχιστεί με τα πόδια.

Μέχρι το 1989, το «Μπλάγκο», όπως το λένε οι ντόπιοι, ήταν μια κλειστή πόλη, απαγορευμένη στους ξένους. Αυτές τις μέρες συμβολίζει την αυξανόμενη κινεζική επιρροή στην Άπω Ανατολή της Ρωσίας. Μεγάλα κομμάτια της οικονομίας έχουν καταλάβει οι Κινέζοι. Οι γεωργικές εκτάσεις - εγκαταλελειμμένες πρώην συλλογικές φάρμες - διοικούνται κυρίως από Κινέζους μετανάστες. Οι μικτοί γάμοι είναι συνηθισμένοι και τα κινέζικα είναι η πιο δημοφιλής ξένη γλώσσα, που διδάσκεται από το σχολείο μέχρι το πανεπιστήμιο.

Οι δύο κοινότητες ζουν δίπλα δίπλα σε σχετική αρμονία, αν και ορισμένοι Ρώσοι δεν είναι τόσο χαρούμενοι για αυτήν την κινεζική «εισβολή». Ορισμένοι βρίσκονται εκτός αγοράς εργασίας λόγω του ανταγωνισμού από τους Κινέζους εργάτες, οι οποίοι αμείβονται πολύ λιγότερο. Αυτοί οι Ρώσοι εργάτες παραπονιούνται για έναν «κίτρινο κίνδυνο».

Παρά αυτές τις ξενοφοβικές παρατηρήσεις, οι Ρώσοι στο Μπλαγκοβέσσενσκ χρειάζονται τους Κινέζους. Οι ντόπιοι εδώ θυμούνται ότι όχι πολύ καιρό πριν, τα κινεζικά προϊόντα τους βοήθησαν να αντιμετωπίσουν τη μετάβαση στη μετασοβιετική Ένωση. Αυτές τις μέρες, χάρη σε Κινέζους επιχειρηματίες -όπως αυτούς που πήραμε συνέντευξη στην έκθεσή μας- η ρωσική οικονομία συνεχίζει τον εκσυγχρονισμό της.



Για τις ρωσικές αρχές, δεν τίθεται θέμα να γυρίσουν την πλάτη στον μεγάλο γείτονά τους. Πράγματι, σύντομα θα κατασκευαστεί μια νέα γέφυρα πάνω από το Αμούρ που θα συνδέει τις δύο χώρες. 24 - Διεθνείς έκτακτες ειδήσεις, κορυφαίες ειδήσεις και τίτλοι


https://www.france24.com/en/20120928-re ... s-tensions